The world is composed of two (groups of) countries, which derive their utility from a polluting activity and the enjoyment of a common environmental quality. The initial situation is both suboptimal and unsustainable: pollution leads to a continuous deterioration of environmental quality. The two countries have heterogeneous preferences for environment, which are private knowledge. This prevents the adoption of abatement policies negociated between the two countries, because each one has a strong incentive to announce in every negociation an arbitrarily low preference for environment. The two countries then engage themselves in a war of attrition, each of them postponing abatement policies, with the hope that the other one will concede first and abate more. We study how long the adjustment is postponed, according to initial conditions, the greenness of the greenest country, the possible range of preferences and the rates of discount and natural regeneration.
Introduction
International negociations about climate change are often disappointing, with advances closely followed by backward steps. Recent events -particularly the failure of the Conference of The Hague, followed by the denunciation of the Kyoto Protocol by President Bush-show that it is easier to sink into a situation in which the adoption of measures allowing the effective reduction of greenhouse gases emissions is postponed, even if each of the actors know that this situation is not sustainable, than to reach an agreement on the sharing of the efforts of reduction of these emissions.
Current negociations come up against many problems, among which the evaluation of the magnitude of the climate change phenomenon and of its consequences, the allocation of historical and future responsibilities, the heterogeneity of countries in terms of abatement costs and damages, but also in terms of "environmental consciousness" and of evaluation of natural assets.
They are difficult too because of the public good nature of environment, which constitutes a strong incentive to free riding. After the unquestionable progress brought by the Kyoto Protocol, which has established quantified objectives of reduction of greenhouse gases emissions, country differentiated and juridically constraining for Annex B countries, the subsequent conferences The first approach consists in looking at the possibilities of formation of environmental agreements from the point of view of noncooperative game theory (see for example Barrett (1994) , (1998), Carraro and Siniscalco (1993), Hoel (1992) ). Most theoretical papers in this strand of literature retain an assumption of homogeneous countries, and focus on the size of the coalitions that can emerge, whereas we want to study the behaviour of heterogeneous countries.
The second approach analyses the problem in a cooperative framework and defines the mechanisms able to sustain cooperation (see for example Chander and Tulkens (1992) , (1995) ). We are rather interested in the mechanisms that allow non-cooperation to last, thus preventing stabilization to emerge.
We describe a world composed of two groups of countries, which derive their utility from a polluting activity but also from the enjoyment of a common environmental quality. The initial situation is commonly known as both suboptimal and unsustainable in the sense that global pollution is excessive and leads to a continuous deterioration of environmental quality through time. The main assumption is the one of heterogeneity of the preferences of the two groups of countries as far as environmental quality is concerned.
These two groups of countries can of course be seen as the group of industrialized countries on the one hand and the group of developing countries on the other. The first one bears a large part of the historical responsibility for global warming; it has reached a level of production and pollution per capita such that its citizens have in average a high "environmental consciousness", and the relative weight of environmental questions on the agenda of its governments is not negligible. The second one will be in a near future an important polluter but, because of its absence of historical responsibility and of its low level of wealth per capita, environmental problems are not high up among its concerns, and its average environmental consciousness is low. But the preference for environment cannot be reduced to a subjective environmental consciousness. It also reflects the marginal damage caused by the worsening of environmental quality or, equivalently, the marginal benefit of an improvement in environmental quality, and countries are uneven in this respect 1 .
One can also see these two groups of countries as the European countries on the one hand and the United States on the other hand. Their evaluation of the reality of the climate change problem is different, and they do not agree on the means that must be brought into play to tackle with it. While European countries are attached -at least by words-to the Kyoto Protocol, United States are reluctant and seem to rely on technical progress to deal with this 1 Anyhow, we do not consider here the case where one group of countries would benefit from a worsening in environmental quality, i.e. would benefit from global warming. For a simple two-countries model studying this dimension of heterogeneity, see for example Caplan, Ellis and Silva (1999). problem, without the need of additional efforts that could jeopardize american growth.
In the two cases -industrialized countries vs developing countries or some of the industrialized countries vs others-the level of preference for environment of each group of country, a mix of subjective environmental counsciousness and of objective marginal damage, is difficult to know with certainty for the other one, because they both behave strategically and are tempted to announce biased preferences in negociations in order to manipulate information.
We study here first the case where the preference for environment of each country 2 is perfectly known by the other one, as a benchmark for the study of the case where this preference is private knowledge, which is the one we are interested in. This asymmetry of information prevents the emergence of a solution negociated between the two countries, because each one has a strong incentive to announce in every negociation an arbitrarily low preference for environment. The two countries then engage themselves in a war of attrition (Alesina and Drazen, 1991) , each of them postponing the implementation of measures intended to reduce pollution with the hope that the other one will concede first.
War of attrition models have been applied to various questions, such as labor strikes, biological competition, industrial organization and, in the political economy field, questions of fiscal stabilization. Bac (1996) and Carré (2000) underline their relevance in the case of environmental questions. Compared to seminal war of attrition models applied to fiscal stabilization (Alesina and Drazen, 1991) , our game has several distinctive features.
First, in the fiscal stabilization problem, stabilization can always be postponed; it is not the case in our model where if nothing is done in finite time, the world economy collapses by excess of pollution. Carré (2000) builds on the Alesina and Drazen's model. She introduces an exogenous deadline such that if fiscal stabilization has not occurred before this date a penalty is paid by all players. Our model cannot be reduced to this framework, because it is impossible here, contrary to what happens in Carré (2000) , that the agents decide to pass beyond the deadline.
Second, we do not suppose that the burden of stabilization is shared (unequally) between the two players. We consider that one of the players, the loser, can decide to stabilize alone environmental quality, as long as it is possible. We also show that if nothing is done to stabilize environmental quality before a certain limit date, one player alone will not be able to achieve stabilization, which will require that the other player also makes an effort of reduction of its pollution. Then the game has two stages: a first one where environmental conditions are such that one country can stabilize alone, a second one where these conditions are so deteriorated that both countries must reduce pollution in order to achieve stabilization.
Third, we consider that our global environmental problem can somewhat better than usual fiscal questions be represented by a war of attrition, because in this problem there really does not exist any supranational authority that could impose on the countries to cut their pollution down, and stabilize environmental quality.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets the problem in the case of perfect information, in order to define the conditions under which it is in this case optimal for one of the two countries to take immediately the measures necessary to stabilize environmental quality.
We show that the crucial parameters that determine the decision are, besides the parameter of preference for environment of the country that has the highest one (the greenest country), the discount rate and the natural regeneration rate. We also show that when it is not optimal to stabilize immediately, the solution is never to stabilize, and let the world economy collapse. In Section 3, information is asymmetric. Considering the case where an immediate stabilization would occur under certainty, we study how long the adjustment will be postponed, and the influence of the parameters that characterize each country. We show that there exists a critical parameter of preference for environment, which depends on initial conditions, on the possible range of preferences and on the rates of discount and natural regeneration. If the parameter of preference of the greenest country is greater than this critical parameter, the optimal stabilization date is, loosely speaking, not too far, and this country will stabilize alone environmental quality. If it is not, stabilization will be late and both countries will have to cut pollution down. Section 4 concludes and discusses possible extensions.
The model with perfect information
Two countries derive their utility from a polluting activity at the level p, supposed constant and identical for the two countries, and from the enjoyment of a common quality of the environment q(t). The instantaneous utility of country i is supposed linear in its two arguments, and writes:
where θ i is the "preference for environment" of group i and characterizes the "greenness" of preferences.
From an initial level q 0 , environmental quality q(t) evolves through time according to the following equation of accumulation:q
where the rate of natural regeneration δ > 0 is supposed constant. Without any policy of limitation of emissions, the environmental quality level is then given by:
We focus of the case of excessive initial pollution: p > δ 2 q 0 , such that environmental quality deteriorates if nothing is done to reduce pollution. So the world economy follows, under constant pollution policies, an unsustainable pollution path.
In order to stabilize environmental quality at time t, global pollution must be reduced to the level P (t) such thatq(t) = 0 :
which defines forall t, P (t) as the sustainable pollution level. Obviously, the effort to reduce pollution is all the greater than stabilization is late.
Within the noncooperative framework assumed in this paper, a solution to the environmental problem consists in two variables: i) which country will make the effort of stabilization first? ii) at which date 3 ?
When information is perfect, the parameters of preference for environmental quality of the two countries θ i et θ j are common knowledge. Let us suppose θ i > θ j . Country i then knows, in a noncooperative framework, that it will bear the whole (if it is sufficient) or the greatest part (if it is not) of the effort of stabilization. Let us name country i, as usual in war of attrition models (Alesina and Drazen, 1991) , the loser, while country j will be the winner. The only variable that must be determined now is the date of stabilization.
The limit dates
There exists a first limit date T m such that the required reduction of total pollution (2p−P (T m )) equals the total pollution by one country (p). Thus the country which makes the effort of reduction of emissions at T m must reduce its pollution to zero in order to stabilize environmental quality, while the other country continues to pollute p. Date T m is then defined by:
from which we derive:
This date is strictly positive if and only if p < δq 0 . In the opposite case, a single country cannot stabilize. So we suppose in the following of this paper this condition fulfilled. We then have, in the initial situation:
which means that the initial green capital q 0 can afford one unrestricted polluting country, but not two, i.e. global pollution emissions greater than p but less than 2p.
According to intuition, the higher the initial pollution p the closer the limit date T m , and the higher the initial environmental quality q 0 the farer T m .
If none of the two countries decide to complete stabilization before date T m , it becomes too late for one country to be able to stabilize by itself. After T m , if the greenest country decides to concede at a date T , it must cut its pollution down to zero, but it will not be enough.
Stabilization of environmental quality cannot take place if the other country does not reduce its pollution as well, down to a level just equal to the natural regeneration capacity. Of course, incentive of the greenest to concede disappears if the winner maintains its pollution level. The problem is then to find when the winner will accept to bear its part of the adjustment, this part being actually smaller than the part of the conceding country: as soon as the loser concedes (that is to say at T ) or later?
Let us then suppose that the loser decides to reduce its pollution to zero at T > T m . From T to the date τ ≥ T at which the winner decides to bear its part of the burden, environmental quality evolves according to the following equation:
and so environmental quality is given by equation:
with (see equation (3)):
from which we deduce:
If the winner goes on with polluting p, environmental quality will be nil at a date t such that q( t) = 0, and we easily see that t depends on T and is defined by:
The utility of each country is then nil. This date is an endogenous deadline, at which the world economy collapses 4 . 4 Notice that because of our choice of a linear utility function we do not impose an infinite penalty on welfare Nevertheless, there exists another limit date T x > T m for which environmental quality is nil if none of the two countries has done anything to reduce pollution before it:
This date is an exogenous deadline, before which something must be done to stabilize environmental quality if the countries want to avoid the collapse of the world economy.
Stabilization before T m
For a country i to complete stabilization at T ≤ T m , we have seen that it must reduce its pollution to the level
and its intertemporal welfare from T ≤ T m is:
where γ > 0 is the social discount rate, supposed equal in the two countries.
Its intertemporal welfare from the origin is then:
We have:
Intertemporal welfare is then a strictly decreasing function of the date of stabilization if the parameter of preference for environment is high enough next to impatience corrected for natural regeneration (θ i > γ − δ); in this case, country i must stabilize at once (T = 0). Its intertemporal welfare is then
. If on the contrary the preference for the in the case of a collapse of the world economy. The incentive to stabilize before the deadline would have of course been greater in the case of a utility function satisfying the Inada condition.
environment of country i is low (θ i < γ − δ), it will not stabilize before T m . Finally, country i is indifferent to any stabilization date between 0 and T m if θ i = γ − δ.
Stabilization after T m
If θ i < γ − δ, country i which has the highest preference for environment and then is the loser does not stabilize before T m .
Let us suppose that it decides to cut its pollution down to zero at T ∈ ]T m , T x ] and that the winner then stabilizes at τ ≥ T . Between T and τ , the utility of the winner is (p + θ j q(t)) as far as it goes on polluting p, q(t) being given by equation (6). After τ , the utility of the winner is u W 2 j (τ ) = (δ + θ j )q(τ ) and its intertemporal welfare after stabilization has occured is:
From T on, the intertemporal utility of the winner which stabilizes at τ is then given by:
with q(t) given by equation (6).
We then have:
Intertemporal welfare is a strictly increasing function of the date of stabilization τ decided by the winner, knowing that the loser cuts its pollution to zero at T , because the winner's parameter of preference for environment is low enough next to impatience corrected for natural regeneration (we are by assumption in the case θ j < γ − δ) and the winner pollutes more than natural regeneration. The winner will not perform stabilization before t( T ) defined by equation (7).
Knowing that the winner will not make any concession to avoid the collapse of the economy, what will the loser do?
The intertemporal welfare of country i from the origin is:
q(t) being given in the first integral by equation (3) and in the second one by equation (6), and we have:
As far as q( t) = 0, we then have:
the optimal behaviour of the loser is to do nothing and let the economy collapse at T x . Figure 1 shows the shape of the solution in the case of perfect information, as a function of the respective values of the preference for environment of country i, of the discount rate and of the natural regeneration rate. The range of the parameters of preference for environment for which country i decides to stabilize immediately environmental quality is all the larger than impatience is low and natural regeneration is high. If the natural regeneration rate is higher than the discount rate, country i stabilizes environmental quality immediately, whatever its preference parameter. Conversely, the range of parameters for which country i waits for the deadline T x and lets the economy collapse is all the larger than impatience is high with respect to natural regeneration.
The consequences of an asymmetric information
Let us now consider the case where information is asymmetric, the value of the preference for environmental quality of each country being private information. We suppose that from the point of view of country i, the preference for environmental quality θ j of country j is drawn from a distribution F (θ j ), with lower and upper bounds θ and θ. The distribution F (θ) is known and a priori supposed common to the two countries. f(θ) is the associated density function.
As far as θ j is unknown for i, we must now characterize noncooperative strategies of unilateral As it is usual in war of attrition models (Alesina and Drazen, 1991) , country i will decide to concede at time T rather than at time T + dT if the expected gain associated with the fact that the other country might decide to concede during dT is smaller than the advantage it has to concede immediately. In every cases, stabilization will take place at best at the same time as when information is perfect, never earlier. Then we restrict ourselves to the cases where, when information is perfect, the countries do not choose to let the world economy collapse at T x , and we restrict for this reason the range of possible preferences such that θ > γ − δ.
The problem is different when the optimal date of concession T is smaller or higher than the limit date T m . In the first case one country is able to stabilize alone, while in the second case the other one must make an effort as well.
Concession before T m

The optimal date of concession
The country that concedes at time T ≤ T m (the loser ) cuts its pollution down to the level δq(T ) − p in order to achieve the stabilization. Its utility is u L1 i (t) = (δ + θ i )q(T ) − p ∀t ≥ T, and its intertemporal welfare from T ≤ T m is V L1 i (T ) given by equation (9).
The country that has not conceded when the other one concedes at time T (the winner ) has a utility u W 1 i (t) = p + θ i q(T ) ∀t ≥ T, and its intertemporal welfare from T is:
The current cost of a concession at time
Country i must choose its strategy of concession, that is a time T * i function of its expectation of the probabilities of concession of the other country, with density h j (t) and distribution function
The intertemporal expected utility of country i is then:
and the problem of country i writes:
If this problem admits an interior solution the optimal conceding time satisfies the first order condition dEU 1 i (T ) dT = 0, which states that the marginal benefit of conceding at time T rather than at time T + dT is equal to the marginal benefit of waiting. One has:
and so
We denote by R j (T ) the probability (conjectured by i) that j concedes between T and T + dT knowing that it has not conceded before 5 , and by B i (T ) the marginal benefit of conceding at time T , for country i. We have:
1−H j (T ) and, according to equation (15),
The optimal conceding time of country i is then given by:
which states that the marginal benefit of waiting is equal to the marginal benefit of conceding.
This equation establishes an optimal time of concession only if the marginal benefit of conceding is strictly positive, which needs θ i > γ −δ, that is a preference for environment of country i all the higher regarding to its impatience than the natural regeneration capacity of the environment is low. In the opposite case, country i does not have any incitation to concede before T m . This condition is fulfilled since we have supposed θ > γ − δ.
One easily checks that the second order condition is satisfied, which ensures that the solution is a maximum:
If the problem of country i does not admit an interior solution, we have T * i = T m and
> 0, which means that the probability that country j concedes between T and T + dT knowing that it has not conceded before is greater than the marginal benefit of conceding at time T. In this case, country i can either adopt the corner solution T * i = T m or pass in the second game, where it cannot stabilize alone. This possibility will be studied after we complete the characterization of the interior solution.
The Nash equilibrium
We consider here the symmetric interior solution in which the two countries concede following the same function T (θ) 6 .
The distribution of the conceding times and the one of the parameters of preference θ are linked. The probability that country j does not concede before time T, 1 − H j (T ), is also the probability that its parameter of preference for environment θ j is smaller than the parameter θ associated to time T, that is F (θ). So we have:
The densities are also linked: we obtain, by derivation of the preceeding equation:
One can deduce the marginal gain of waiting for country i:
which yields, using equation (16):
In the case of a uniform distribution of the θ we have f (θ) =
which integrates into:
We suppose that if a country has the highest possible parameter of preference it concedes immediately: T (θ) = 0. This assumption allows us to fully characterize the optimal conceding time for a parameter of preference θ :
We easily see that lim θ θ T (θ) → +∞. But the solution given by equation (22) is valid only for parameters of preference for environment θ such that T (θ) < T m . We then calculate the limit parameter of preference θ m corresponding to the limit date of concession T m (more precisely, T m − ε with ε very small):
For parameters of preference between θ m and θ, concession occurs before T m . For parameters of preference smaller than θ m the solution that prevails is the corner solution: T (θ) = T m . In this case, the countries must ask themselves whether they must stabilize environmental quality at T m or whether they must play the second part of the game and postpone stabilization after this date.
θ m depends on the parameters of the model (range of preferences, social discount rate, natural regeneration rate) but also on the initial situation of the world economy in terms of pollution and environmental quality, through T m .
One can easily show that:
The smaller the initial pollution and the higher the initial environmental quality, the farer the limit date T m and the smaller the limit parameter of preference for environment for which the solution given by equation (22) is valid. In other words, if the initial level of pollution is high or the initial environmental quality low, T m will be close from now and θ m close from θ, and a stabilization before T m by a single country will be unlikely, except if the greener country is very green.
This means that when the range of preferences is larger on the right everything being equal, the parameter of preference beyond which the stabilization occurs before T m is higher.
One can also show that ∂θm ∂(θ−θ) > 0. So a larger potential dispersion of the parameters of preference for environment leads to an increase of the parameter of preference beyond which the stabilization occurs before T m .
Concession between T m and T x
Suppose now that an interior solution to the first game does not exist. Is it then optimal for country i to adopt the corner solution of the first game and to stabilize at T m , or is it optimal to postpone stabilization again and play the second game? We first study the solution of the second game and then answer to this question.
The optimal date of concession in the second game
If none of the two countries has conceded at time T m they reveal that their parameter of preference is smaller than θ m . The range of the parameters of preference is thus reduced to [θ, θ m [ . Then, the country with a parameter of preference equal to θ m − ε (with ε → 0) knows with certainty that it has the highest possible parameter of preference. But it is unable to stabilize alone: the other country must cut its pollution down as well.
Let us suppose that the loser cuts its pollution down to zero at T > T m . It reveals then that its parameter of preference for environment is higher than the one of the other country.
The winner does not face uncertainty any more and is in a situation of perfect information.
We have already studied the problem the winner faces and shown how its intertemporal welfare evolves with the date at which it chooses to stabilize (equation (11)). Here, as far as θ > γ − δ, intertemporal welfare is a strictly decreasing function of this date, and the winner chooses to stabilize immediately, as soon as the loser has cut its pollution down to zero. The loser with a parameter of preference equal to θ m − ε will, knowing the behaviour of the winner, decide to cut its pollution down at once: T (θ m − ε) = T m .
The instantaneous utilities and intertemporal welfares of the two countries from T > T m then
, and the intertemporal cost of conceding is:
One can then write the expected intertemporal utility of country i, EU 2 i (T ), and find the optimal conceding time, which satisfies the first order condition dEU 2 i (T ) dT = 0. We easily show that:
and we deduce
The second order condition is satisfied.
As in the previous case, R j (T ) is the probability conjectured by i that j concedes between time T and time T + dT, knowing that it has not conceded before. It is the marginal gain of waiting. This marginal gain is equal to the marginal benefit of conceding which, for country i having a parameter of preference for environment
The denominator of this expression is always positive because T ≤ T x . So the marginal benefit of conceding has the sign of its numerator θ i e δT − γe δTm .
One see that:
• In the case where θ i > γ, the marginal benefit of conceding is then strictly positive when T tends towards T m , it is increasing, and lim T Tx B i (T ) = +∞. An interior solution can exist in this case.
• In the case where θ i ≤ γ, the marginal benefit of conceding is negative when T tends towards T m ; besides, we easily show that
has the sign of 2θ i − γ. So if θ i ≤ γ 2 , the marginal benefit of conceding decreases (or is constant and negative) over time, and no interior solution can exist: country i will wait for the deadline T x and let the economy collapse, if country j does not cut its pollution before that. On the contrary, if θ i > γ 2 , the marginal benefit of conceding is increasing and there exists a date from which it becomes positive. This date is
An interior solution T > T i can then exist. Figure 2 shows the marginal benefit of conceding in the cases θ i > γ and γ 2 < θ i ≤ γ. The marginal benefit of conceding is constant before T m and then increasing, with a discontinuity at T m and a jump downwards. However, stabilization will not occur with certainty before T m .
Intuitively, everything depends at each instant of the conjecture of each country regarding the probability that the other country concedes at this instant, knowing that it has not conceded before. If the expectation of this probability is always higher than the marginal benefit of conceding, no country will concede before T x . On the other hand, if this expectation is high today but diminishes as time approaches T m , the concession can possibly occur before T m ; if it is not the case but that this expectation increases after T m slower than the marginal benefit of conceding, the concession will occur between T m and T x . We now try to characterize more precisely the optimal date of concession.
The Nash equilibrium
Let us then suppose θ > γ 2 , in order to have a chance that an interior solution exists. In the case of the symmetric Nash equilibrium we show that:
with T (θ) < 0 because we have restricted ourselves to cases where the marginal benefit of conceding is positive, and so, for a uniform distribution:
T (θ) = 1 θ − θ e δTx − e δT (θ) γe δT m − θe δT (θ) .
This equation cannot be integrated with elementary functions. A numerical study, with the initial condition lim θ θm T (θ) = T m , shows that the solution is a continuous and decreasing function T (θ), with T (θ) = T x . Besides, one gets:
, whereas when concession occurs before T m one gets:
lim T (θ m ) = − 1 (θ m − θ)(θ m + δ − γ) .
The slope of the function of concession is then greater (in absolute value) before θ m than after.
A comparison of intertemporal welfares
We must now see whether when no interior solution exists in the first game country i must concede at T m or play the second game.
Straightforward but tedious calculations (cf. appendix) allow us to show that:
The expected intertemporal welfare obtained by playing the second game is then always greater than the one obtained by choosing the corner solution of the first game. This ensures that in the absence of an interior solution to the first game, country i will not choose to cut its pollution down at T m but will postpone further stabilization.
The previous results are summed up in figure 3 , which shows the optimal date of concession for each country on the whole range θ, θ , and therefore the solution of the stabilization game. 
Conclusion and extensions
We have stressed in this paper some of the reasons that can prevent the apparition of a cooperative solution to excessive and unsustainable pollution. We have shown, in the war of attrition framework, that the excess of pollution will be all the more persistent than the greenest of the two countries is less green, than the initial conditions are adverse (high pollution and low initial natural capital), than the countries are optimistic concerning the possible range of the preference parameters, and than impatience corrected for natural regeneration is high. We have also shown that it can be rational for the greenest country to wait so long that it cannot stabilize alone.
Natural possible extensions are the following. First, it would obviously be very interesting to extend this framework to the case of more than two countries, in the spirit of generalized war of attrition models (cf. Bulow and Klemperer, 1999) . Second, and probably more important, we could introduce more asymmetry between the players, which are here identical but for their preference for environment. For instance, they could have different social discount rates (one country could be more impatient than the other one), or different initial levels of pollution.
